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Abstract: Contracts play a major role in today’s projects and operations. 
Contractual performance is defined as the result of the contract and the process and 
organization that support the contract lifecycle. It is determined by several 
interdependent factors, albeit they are generally managed without considering these 
interactions. A DSM is built to first identify potential relationships, either cause-
effect or correlation, between contractual performance factors. This will allow for 
an easier and better decision about progress axis priorities in the field of Contract 
Management. 
Keywords: Contract Management, network-based modeling, network-based 
analysis, network-based decision, decision aiding 
1. Introduction 
Contracts play a major role in today’s projects and operations. The way they are designed, 
awarded, executed and closed may strongly influence the performance of both clients and 
contractors.  
1.1. Contract 
Some examples of definitions are given as follows. 
“An agreement between private parties creating mutual obligations enforceable by law. 
The basic elements required for the agreement to be a legally enforceable contract are: 
mutual assent, expressed by a valid offer and acceptance; adequate consideration; 
capacity; and legality. Possible remedies for breach of contract include general damages, 
consequential damages, reliance damages, and specific performance” (Kim 2017). 
“A contract is an agreement giving rise to obligations which are enforced or recognized 
by law. The factor which distinguishes contractual from other legal obligations is that they 
are based on the agreement of the contracting parties” (McKendrick 2018). 
“A contract is an agreement with the intent of creating one or several juridical obligations. 
It is a voluntary engagement, formal or informal, between two or more parties and 
recognized by law” (Barnett and Oman 2016). 
Contract is thus a deliverable (document), designed, written, signed, executed, managed 
and closed by organizational entities / actors, following a specific process. At least two 
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entities/actors are involved in a contract, often called Client and Contractor. More broadly, 
the contract implies the notion of stakeholders and their satisfaction at different moments 
of its lifecycle. A contract may be a unique, isolated operation, or may be integrated in a 
bigger one involving multiple contracts. In all cases, contracts have to be managed. 
1.2. Contract Management 
According to the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply, Contract Management 
(CM) is “the process of systematically and efficiently managing contract creation, 
execution, and analysis for the purpose of maximizing financial and operational 
performance and minimizing risk” (CIPS 2007). 
It is important to emphasize that CM is an organizational process and, for this reason, can 
be different from one organization to another. However, the need for CM is shared by any 
kind of organization, public and private, in order to reduce costs, deal with regulatory 
requirements, and more broadly improve performance. 
1.3. Contractual Performance 
If we consider contracts as the tangible output of an organizational process (as seen in the 
previous paragraph), “contractual performance” is defined by WillBe Group as the 
combination of three elements:  
- Performance of the output (contract): the ability of the contract to satisfy the 
parties involved,  
- Performance of the Contract Management process: the way of obtaining the 
output (efficiency),  
- Performance of the organization that performs the Contract Management process. 
The aim of a Contract Management Framework (CMF) is to provide a clear vision of 
where and how much progress has to be done, in the aim of improving (or maintaining or 
restoring) global and long-term contractual performance of the entity. As described in the 
rest of the paper, the first part of our research work consists of building a performance-
oriented CMF. A perspective will be to relate this to classical risk management, 
considering the risk of non-contractual performance. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces a survey about 
existing (and available) Contract Management Frameworks. This helps to build the 
research question, exposed in Section 3. Then, Section 4 introduces the research approach, 
which is executed in Section 5 with a first model of interdependent contractual 
performance factors. Section 6 will discuss about this first version and will draw some 
conclusions and perspectives. 
2. Background 
Contract Management Frameworks (CMF) are diverse and numerous, albeit with 
similarities, notably in terms of nature of organizational entity that provides them. It is 
obvious that other CMFs exist without being public, so our literature review is restricted 
to available information. CMFs have been found for mainly 4 types of organizations: 
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- Public organizations, at a national or local level, that audit procurement or 
purchasing-related activities (Department of Finance and Administration of 
Australian Government 2007; Department of Treasury and Finance Victoria State 
Government 2013; National Audit Office UK 2016; National Treasury 
Department of South Africa 2010). 
- Public organizations, at a national or local level, that are clients for contracts with 
generally private contractors (Department of Health of Government of Western 
Australia 2012; Department of Housing and Public Works 2017; Municipal 
Association of Victoria 2018; Purchasing and Procurement Center of Malaysia 
2017; Renewal SA 2015): the process is constrained by public regulations, so at 
least the award process should be public, but in some cases the entity publishes 
its overall process. 
- Consulting companies, that aim at assisting either clients or contractors, like 
Deloitte (Anderson and Mendel 2017) or PriceWaterHouseCoopers 
(PriceWaterHouseCoopers 2010). 
- Worldwide institutions, that aim at capturing best practices or just providing 
guidance and standards (World Bank 2017). 
Most of them are process-oriented, describing either a sequential process, an iterative 
process or a cycle. They generally distinguish activities depending on their position before 
or after the contract signature:  
- Upstream (or pre-award) activities: Preparing the business case and securing 
management approval; Assembling the project team; Developing contract 
strategy; Risk Assessment; Developing contract exit strategy; Developing a 
contract management plan; Drafting specifications and requirements; 
Establishing the form of contract; Establishing the pre-qualification, qualification 
& tendering procedures; Appraising suppliers; Drafting ITT (Invitation To 
Tender) documents; Evaluating tenders; Negotiating; Awarding the contract 
- Downstream (or post-award) activities: Change management; Service delivery 
management; Relationship management; Contract administration; Risk re-
assessment; Purchasing organization’s performance and effectiveness review; 
Contract closure 
The next Section introduces their limits concerning complexity and introduces the 
academic question. 
3. Limits and Research Problem 
Complexity is recognized as influencing the way contracts are managed and their results 
(Caldwell, Roehrich, and Davies 2009; Jarkas 2017; Perona and Miragliotta 2004; 
Sivadasan et al. 2006). For instance, the CIPS (Chartered Institute of Procurement and 
Supply) cites increasing contract volumes and complexity as reasons to recognize the 
importance and benefits of Contract Management (CIPS 2007).  
In some existing CMFs, efforts have been done to link contract management elements, 
often processes and often with time-related links (sequential links, phases, with or without 
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overlap, cycles, …). Some consequences of contract-related complexity are well-known, 
like for instance operational uncertainty, directly linked to financial risk (Beg 2015). 
However, some indirect effects, with possible propagations, or amplification, or 
retroaction, or variation (either of magnitude or even direction) of the links, are not well 
studied yet. It is thus a challenge to integrate the complexity of the contract management 
system, in order to improve contractual performance or increase risk of contractual 
performance.  
The objective of the paper is thus to model interdependencies between factors of an 
existing Contract Management Framework, developed by the WillBe Group French 
consulting company. The justification of this question is that this model could be used for 
analyzing the CM factors network, in order to make easier and more reliable decisions 
about where to put priorities for performance improvement. The definition of these 
progress axis is today generally based on:  
– models where factors are often considered as independent,  
– analysis based on an individual assessment of performance or maturity, 
– a decision-making process which does not simultaneously consider multiple 
parameters, like existing performance and importance of the factor, and required 
effort of the progress action. 
All these reasons, operational need and literature gap, have justified the start of this 
research program, the first step being the network modeling project, presented here.  
4. Research method 
In this field, it is quite mandatory to be as close as possible of fieldwork, this is why we 
chose to use a constructivist approach (Mäkinen 1999), notably a Design Research 
Methodology-based approach, with alternation of prescriptive and descriptive study 
(Blessing and Chakrabarti 2009; Laurel 2003).  
The target is an overall decision aiding process inspired by (Marle 2014), with a 3-step 
process, consisting of: 1/ modeling, 2/ analyzing a network, then 3/ making decisions 
considering specific complexity-oriented information obtained from previous steps. This 
paper focuses on step 1, the modeling of contractual performance factors network. 
This step is based on the well-known DSM modeling technique, which emerged around 
thirty years ago and has spread, both in terms of volume of use and of nature of elements 
(Browning 2015, 2001; Eppinger and Browning 2012; Marle and Vidal 2008; Steward 
1981). Classically, the DSM offers a compact structure for visualization of complex 
networks. Moreover, it allows for systematic exploration of potential interdependencies 
by navigating through rows and columns. The main hypothesis was that, to our knowledge, 
no similar network currently exists, and we argue that DSM is more suitable to create this 
network between such immaterial and intangible factors. The assumption was more about 
appropriation by users, both for building and manipulating this network. 
This modeling project relies on four components: 
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– 1: internal experts’ judgment (done) 
– 2: literature review (done), 
– 3: missions (ongoing), 
– 4: clients’ interviews (perspective at the moment of paper submission). 
Two of them depend on external parameters and actors, with associated uncertainty (actual 
timeline and scope of missions, relevance of missions regarding the research question, 
number, adequacy and response time of interviewees). 
One mission is currently ongoing with a possible link with the research. Authors hope that 
at the moment of the final submission of the paper, some additional information will have 
been provided by this fieldwork. Moreover, interviews will be structured and conducted 
with a refined version of the model, obtained by combining literature, internal experts’ 
judgment and confrontation to the ongoing mission. This is planned for the end of 2019 – 
start of 2020. After this initialization phase, a continuous change management process will 
be applied. 
5. Proposal of a first model of interdependencies between contractual 
performance factors 
This Section introduces, first the initial version of the CMF developed by WillBe Group, 
second the modeling principles for interdependence identification, and third the refined 
network-based version of the CMF. 
5.1. The initial 19-factor framework 
Based on a CMF literature review and expertise of internal consultants, numerous factors 
had been selected, renamed, merged or broken down in order to get the initial 19-factor 
framework developed by WillBe Group: F1-Contract type, F2-Contractor choice, F3-Risk 
allocation, F4-Governance quality, F5-Quality of execution control, F6-Abusive claims 
from the contractor, F7-Client opportunism, F8-Respect of mutual obligations, F9-
Interdependence between contractors, F10-Difference in clauses interpretation, F11-
Transaction Costs, F12-Input data, F13-Economic equilibrium, F14-Deliberate 
underestimation of constraints, F15-Incompleteness of information, F16-Evolution of 
needs, F17-Renegotiation ex-post, F18-Alignment to evolution (market, technology), F19-
Relational dimension. 
The following paragraph illustrates how interdependencies are identified. 
5.2. The seek for interdependencies between these factors 
Interdependency exists when actions or events in one system affects or may affect 
elements in another system (Marle and Vidal 2016). Several authors introduced different 
types of interdependencies, like for instance:  
- Klir and Valach with linear, circular and recursive interdependencies, in terms of 
causality of phenomena  (Klir and Valach 1965). 
- Thompson and later Browning with the parallel, the sequential, the coupled and 
the contingent dependencies (Browning 2001; Thompson 1967). The notion of 
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temporal relative position between the two elements is still present, so as the 
notion of one-way or reciprocal dependency and the notion of sure or potential 
dependency. 
- Le Moigne with interdependencies between three sub-systems: the decision 
system, the information system and the operational system (Le Moigne 1990). 
- Marle with the hierarchical link (typically found in WBS), the contribution link 
(meaning that one element contributes to the advancement of the other one), the 
sequential link, the influence link (if a decision or a change in element 1 may 
involve a change in element 2), and the exchange link if the two elements have 
an information flow (Marle 2002). 
- Worren with the commitment, the governance, the activity, the resource and the 
social interdependencies (Worren 2012). 
An interdependency is thus described like in (Marle and Vidal 2016) through the 
characterization of which attribute(s) change(s), with a level of certainty (potential or sure) 
and of intensity (the number of attributes that change and the amount of change for each 
attribute). Attributes depend on the nature of elements, but classical attributes in contracts 
are related to cost, time, performance, and broadly speaking it describes the state of the 
element. This notion of attribute is not treated in this paper. 
5.3. The contractual performance factors network v1.0 
Based on initial list of factors and on previously described strategy for interdependency 
identification, the initial version of the contractual performance DSM has been built.  
While looking for interdependencies, we noticed that a factor, F19, was linked with several 
ones, but in fact the links were more on a hierarchical nature (in terms of belonging to the 
same branch of a tree). We then considered this factor as a family of factors, this is why 
this updated version contains 18 factors. Moreover, in some cases, it is possible to give a 
sense to the positive or negative nature of a link. For instance, a good “Respect of mutual 
obligations” may decrease the necessity to run numerous controls and meetings, and then 
decrease “Transaction costs”. However, other factors like “Contract type” and “Contractor 
choice” may be linked, albeit without any sense to an amplifying of retroactive effect. This 
is why for the moment we stay with positive values only, with this additional information 
on some specific cells. 
Figure 2 hereunder represents the combined DSM, where each cell is the product of 
likelihood of interdependence and impact in case of interdependence. There are values 
from 1 to 9, 9 meaning that the interdependency has the strongest likelihood and the 
strongest impact. This development has been done right before submission of revised 
paper. Analysis is still ongoing, but for now it seems that there are enough levels to 
discriminate interdependencies.  
The reading convention for (i,j) cell is: factor Fi has an influence on factor Fj. 
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Figure 2: version 1 of the network-based CMF 
Next Section will discuss about results at date and next steps to reinforce the robustness 
of the model. 
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6. Discussion and perspectives 
Results of this first DSM-based modeling step are promising. The first lesson learnt is that 
factors list had to be adapted while considering interdependence between them. Questions 
arise about incorporating new factors, breaking existing ones down, merging other ones, 
and renaming some factors (for instance to improve clarity of definition and avoid 
overlaps). Another question arising from this initial work was the meaning of the cell. It 
is now after an iteration related to occurrence and impact of the interdependency.  
Internal experts (from the consulting company) and current panel of external experts (from 
the client of the ongoing mission) recognize: 1/ the potential use of this model as an 
assistance to the prioritization of contract management progress actions; this may be 
helped by identification of key interdependences (strongest values in Figure 2), and 
possible chains and loops; 2/ the need to keep refining the network-based model and 
making it more robust, simultaneously generic but with the capacity to be quickly declined 
in specific contexts. 
Future steps of this modeling project will consist in using maturity-based assessment of 
real organizations in order to: 1/ improve robustness of the network model by studying 
possible correlations between factors, depending on their maturity status; 2/ display factors 
list (and DSM) according to different sequences, the chronological vision being one of 
them (since there are factors that are clearly before or after contract signature, and some 
factors may be present all along the contract lifecycle); 3/ assess priorities for 
improvement, by combining maturity, importance and amount of work. This is inspired 
by previous work in automotive development context (González, Marle, and Bocquet 
2007; Gonzalez Ramirez, Marle, and Bocquet 2008); 4/ group factors and the group actors 
according to the factors they are associated with and the links between these factors. This 
is inspired by other existing clustering works in nuclear construction and oil and gas 
sectors (Marle, Jaber, and Pointurier 2019; Ventroux, Marle, and Vidal 2018). 5/ finally, 
we realized that the link between factors and activities should be more explicit, and an 
MDM-based approach could help that. We will also try to relate performance factors to 
outcomes and results of both contract and contract management (we may have one time a 
good result but with poor contract management and in fact poor efficiency and high risk 
of failure on a next contract). More important for us is the relation between network 
consideration and final performance, meaning that our main assumption in complex 
systems (and DSM modeling) is that if they are not managed with a mental representation 
and understanding of their complexity, then decisions may be inadequate and involve 
failures or at least major waste (of time, money, energy, trust, …). 
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